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CASE SUMMARIES
is one scheme or several is a question for the jury, and in this case,
the evidence supported a jury finding of a single conspiracy to de-
fraud the IRS spanning many years and involving many individu-
als in Alexander's businesses. The cases that Alexander relied upon
for his defense to these counts were expressly limited to their facts.
Also, the court instructed the jury that when a count alleges two
different videotapes or magazines to be obscene, they need find
only one of them obscene in order to return a guilty verdict. Thus,
the verdicts returned on the obscenity counts were not inconsis-
tent. The standard of obscenity that Alexander challenged was laid
down by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California,
and therefore the circuit court was bound by it. The forfeiture,
provided by 18 U.S.C. § 1467, is allowed when there is a sufficient
nexus between racketeering activities and protected materials ac-
quired through such activities. The court held that obscenity is not
protected by the First Amendment, and a convicted racketeer may
not launder dirty money by investing it in materials that involve
protected speech. It also held that there was no unconstitutional
chilling effect at work because this forfeiture was a criminal pen-
alty and not a prior restraint. Further, the court held that the pen-
alties imposed did not violate Alexander's Eighth Amendment
rights, and there was ample evidence to support his conviction on
all counts.
-C.L.
BOURNE Co. v. TOWER RECORDS, INC., 976 F.2D 99 (2D CIR. 1992).
Walt Disney Company and Buena Vista Home Video appealed
from a preliminary injunction issued by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, barring their use of
songs from the movie "Pinocchio" on videocassette trailer
advertisements.
-In 1939, Disney and Bourne entered into a copyright agree-
ment which assigned to Bourne copyrights to the songs from the
movie "Pinocchio." Disney claimed that the agreement allowed
them to freely use the songs but only gave Bourne the right to
collect fees for the use of the songs by third parties. Bourne
claimed that, under the agreement, Disney relinquished all rights
to the songs, except for the right to employ them in public per-
formances of motion pictures. Regardless of the proper meaning of
the agreement, over the next five decades Disney used the songs in
ways inconsistent with Bourne's view of its agreement with Disney.
However, Bourne did not object to Disney's use of the songs until
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that in seeking an
injunction against Disney's further use of the songs, Bourne was
required to initially demonstrate irreparable harm. Although irrep-
arable harm is presumed when a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of copyright infringement, the court stated that it is equally
settled that a party's delay in the enforcement of copyrights rebuts
that presumption. The court held that Disney's use of the songs
for several decades and Bourne's failure to object to the violations
of its claimed contractual rights demonstrated a lack of urgency for
preliminary relief. Because Bourne failed to establish the existence
of irreparable harm, the circuit court held that Bourne was not en-
titled to an injunction and reversed the judgment of the district
court.
-J.B.K.
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC. V. PROFESSIONAL REAL
ESTATE INVESTORS, INC., 944 F.2D 1525 (9TH CIR. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 1557 (1992).
A group of California movie studios brought a copyright in-
fringement action against hotel operators (PRE), challenging the
operators' rental of video discs to hotel guests to watch in their
hotel suites. PRE filed antitrust counterclaims against the movie
studios, alleging that the copyright infringement suit was a sham
brought with the intent to monopolize and restrain trade in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. The United States District Court for the
Central District of California granted summary judgment to the
hotel operators (PRE) on the infringement claim, and this was af-
firmed on appeal. However, the same district court entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the movie studios on the antitrust coun-
terclaim, and PRE appealed, alleging:
(1)the court focused only on the lawsuit and failed to consider
PRE's other allegations of anticompetitive conduct;
(2)the copyright infringement action was a sham, thus the stu-
dios have no immunity from antitrust liability under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine;
(3)the court should have permitted PRE additional discovery to
prove that he copyright lawsuit was a sham; and,
(4)the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the pen-
dent state law claims when it dismissed PRE's counterclaim.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's entry of summary judgment for the studios on the antitrust
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